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Abstract 
 
This study examines the stability of money demand in the proposed West African Monetary 
Union (WAMU). The study uses annual data for the period 1981 to 2015 from thirteen of the 
fifteen countries making-up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A 
standard money demand function is designed and estimated using a bounds testing approach 
to co-integration and error-correction modeling. The findings show divergence across 
ECOWAS member states in the stability of money demand. This divergence is informed by 
differences in cointegration, stability, short run and long term determinants, and error 
correction in event of a shock.  
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1. Introduction 
This study investigates if the demand for money is stable in the long run in the potential West 
African Monetary Union (WAMU). Three main tendencies in policy and scholarly circles 
motivate the positioning of the study, namely: (i) the policy importance of establishing 
whether the demand for money in the proposed WAMU is stable in the long run or not; (ii) 
current debates in the extant literature on the connection between the stability of money 
demand and monetary policy effectiveness and (iii) gaps in the literature. In what follows, 
these motivational elements are expanded in the same order of chronology.   
 First, as concerns the relevance of the inquiry to policy, the recent experience of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) in terms of currency crisis has shown that protocols in 
monetary negotiations should be carefully designed to be robust to a variety of 
macroeconomic uncertainties because associated asymmetric shocks are not without 
substantial detrimental development externalities (Asongu, 2013a). Against this backdrop, a 
comprehensive understanding of the robustness of monetary policy in a potential monetary 
union (such as the proposed WAMU) is essential in the process of economic integration 
towards a common currency area.  
 Second, the importance of interest rate as an instrument of monetary policy (in the 
light of the stability of the demand for money) has not reached a clear consensus in the 
literature (Asongu, 2016). A strand of the literature posits that if the demand for money is 
stable, mainstream monetary policy instruments can be employed to influence the supply of 
money (Poole, 1970).  In essence, as documented in Folarin and Asongu (2017), this strand 
maintains that the interest rate is conducive as an effective monetary policy instrument if and 
only if the demand for money is characterised by significant stability.  
A contending strand however maintains that the use of interest rates by central banks 
in influencing monetary policy is inappropriate in developing nations, essentially because the 
demand for money is stable (Rao & Kumar, 2009). In relation to this strand, since predicting 
the money function is difficult, the interest rate can be adjusted to an unstable demand for 
money function. In essence, drivers of money supply (e.g. scale and opportunity variables), 
could fall short of being associated with much information about the demand for money. This 
is partly because information on the opportunity cost or the forgone alternative of keeping 
money is reflected in opportunity variables. The interest rate is a natural example of an 
opportunity variable. Hence, the demand for money can be defined in terms of some 
unpredictability, essentially because changes in interest rates are exogenous to the demand 
function of money. It is principally on the grounds that the demand for money cannot easily 
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be predicted that interest rates can be used as an instrument of monetary policy (Folarin & 
Asongu, 2017). 
 There is another contending strand in the literature which is of the position that 
monetary policy is technically not feasible in less developed countries because of structural 
deficiencies. Weeks (2010) within this framework acknowledges that the fundamental 
approach of monetary policy is unfeasible in most African countries because governments 
lack the relevant instruments with which to implement corresponding monetary policy. These 
deficiencies in appropriate mechanisms are situated along: (i) the role of private credit by 
means of channels such as open market operations and (ii) efforts towards influencing 
borrowing rates within the private sector via changes in interest rates at which commercial 
banks can borrow from a central bank.  
 It is important to note that the underlying inappropriateness of monetary policy is 
consistent with traditional discretionary monetary policy arrangements that are focused on 
ensuring economic growth and price stability. Such fundamental discretionary policies are 
founded on the premise of either using monetary policy in a contractionary sense (i.e. when 
economic output exceeds its potential) or from an expansionary perspective (i.e. when                                        
economic output is below its potential). This discourse is in accordance with the literature on 
instrumenting inflation targeting in order to implement monetary policy that is 
countercyclical (Ghironi & Rebucci, 2000; Mishkin, 2002; Cavoli & Rajan, 2008; Cristadoro 
& Veronese, 2011; Levine, 2012; Asongu, 2014a). 
 Third, as recently argued by Folarin and Asongu (2017), the extant contemporary 
empirical literature on the stability of money demand in developing countries is 
fundamentally motivated by the role financial innovation has played in enhancing the 
instability of money demand. Some recent literature that is consistent with this argument 
include: Ndirangu and Nyamongo (2015), Kumar (2011) and Nachega et al. (2001) for 
Uganda, twenty developing countries and Kenya, respectively.  Within the specific context of 
this study which focuses on the WAMU, the extant literature pertaining to this potential 
monetary zone has fundamentally focused on investigating if the potential currency area is 
feasible or unfeasible. Most accounts in the corresponding literature maintain that while it 
may be feasible in the long run, conditions (of convergence in and synchronisation of 
macroeconomic variables) do not warrant a short run thesis on feasibility. As summarised in 
Section 2, conclusions have been situated along the proposed WAMU’s feasibility (Diop, 
2012; Ogunkola, 2005); unfeasibility (Houssa, 2008; Debrun et al., 2005; Chuku, 2012; 
Alagidede et al., 2012; Tsangarides & Qureshi, 2006; Cham, 2009; Harvey & Cushing, 2015; 
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Asongu, 2013b, 2014b, 2014c; Dufrénot & Sugimoto, 2013; Diop et al., 2018) and 
conditional feasibility (Ekpoh & Udoh, 2013; Saka et al., 2015; Asongu, 2014a; Bénassy-
Quéré & Coupet, 2005; Bangaké, 2008)2.   
 This study is an extension of the underlying literature (highlighted in the third strand) 
in order to contribute to the extant debate on the effectiveness of monetary policy (articulated 
in the second strand), with the ultimate goal of improving policy insights into the feasibility 
of the potential WAMU (discussed in the first strand). The suggested extension is achieved 
by employing an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing empirical strategy to 
cointegration developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). The strategy enables an error correction 
modelling approach to assess long and short term relationships between money supply and its 
determinants. The findings show divergence across ECOWAS member states in the stability 
of money. This divergence is informed by differences in cointegration, structural breaks, 
short run and long term determinants and error correction in event of a shock. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sections 2 briefly summarises the 
extant literature while issues pertaining to the data and methodology are covered in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results while Section 5 concludes with future 
research directions.  
 
2. Literature review 
Before summarizing the extant literature, it is worthwhile to briefly engage the historical 
context of the proposed WAMU. In accordance with Asongu et al. (2017), a prior exposition 
on the historical context of the African Union (AU) sets the groundwork for the proposed 
regional monetary union. According to the narrative, the AU has as a fundamental objective, 
the creation of the African Economic Community. This objective which was framed in the 
June 1991 Abuja treaty estimates the establishment of an African Central Bank by 2018. 
Moreover, a harmonized economic community is set to precede the creation of this bank. 
Ultimately, the African Monetary Union (AMU) is contextualized with an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) that is managed by an African Central Bank for the interest of AU 
member states. Most importantly, an AMU is a step-wise process that entails the integration 
of proposed regional monetary unions, among others; the Southern African Monetary Union, 
                                                          
2
 The positioning of the study is also partly motivated by a contemporary strand of literature on the relevance of 
financial access and alternative modes of financing in Africa’s development (Triki & Gajigo, 2014;  Amponsah, 
2017; Danquah et al., 2017;  Kusi et al., 2017; Boamah, 2017; Bayraktar & Fofack, 2018; Tchamyou, 2018a, 
2018b; Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu et al., 2018a, 2018b; Kusi & Opoku‐ Mensah, 2018; Gyeke-Dako et al., 
2018;  Bokpin et al., 2018). 
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the East African Monetary Union and the WAMU. The extant literature pertaining to the 
WAMU is summarized in what follows.   
 The fundamentals of a common monetary system in the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) which, were established in May 1975 are broadly in line 
with the objectives articulated in the Treaty of Lagos in 1975. This is a treaty that laid the 
foundation of ECOWAS by emphasizing the imperative of harmonizing economic and 
monetary policies across member states (Harvey & Cushing, 2015). The underlying treaty 
was later ratified by fifteen countries making-up the ECOWAS body, namely: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Togo. It is also important to note that while 
Cape Verde (or Cabo Verde) joined in 1976, Mauritania left in 2000.  
 Against the above backdrop, the ECOWAS consists if English-, French- and 
Portuguese-speaking nations. Furthermore, when the regional body was established, a 
common currency was already being used between countries in the French-speaking 
community of the region, namely: the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU). In other words, the currency is for the most part used by the former French 
Colonies of Africa (CFA) in the West African block. This is contrary to the English-speaking 
former colonies that preferred monetary experience and independence in the post-colonial 
period.  
 The idea of using a single currency across the region (i.e. proposed WAMU) was 
reiterated and further articulated in July 1991 by member states. Under the auspices of the 
new umbrella, a process of monetary integration was proposed to be adopted in two stages. 
The first consisted of establishing a common currency in the non-CFA countries. This was to 
be known as the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). The second phase consisted of 
merging the WAMZ with the WAEMU. 
 Later in the year 2000, a common ambition was expressed by member states of the 
ECOWAS to accelerate the process of monetary integration, notably: with the ambition of 
establishing the WAMZ in January 2015 and merging the WAEMU with the WAMZ by 
2020. With the first and second stages expected to be realised in 2015 and 2020 respectively, 
in July 2014, the ambition of materialising the first page was postponed. This postponement 
is the fourth, given the three initial postponements in 2003, 2005 and 2009. The main 
justification put forward for the underlying postponement has centred on the absence of 
convergence among member states and insufficient preparation by member states.   The two-
phase initiative for monetary integration was changed to a single currency strategy in July 
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2014 with emphasis on: (i) the abandonment of the first stage in 2015 and (ii) a desire for the 
creation of the single regional currency by 2020.  
  
 Table 1: Summary of empirical studies on the proposed West African Monetary Union (WAMU) 
Author(s) Period Countries Methodology Feasibility Justification/ 
recommendation 
      
Ogunkola (2005) 1970-1997 ECOWAS A RER variability 
model 
Yes  Growing RER convergence  
Debrunet al. (2005) 
 
1996-2000 ECOWAS A calibration model No Presence of fiscal 
heterogeneity  
Bénassy-Quéré & 
Coupet (2005) 
1986-1999 17 Sub-Saharan African 
countries(CAEMC, 
WAEMU, WAMZ and 
ECOWAS) 
Clustering analysis Yes/No Yes with Gambia, Ghana 
and Sierra Leone  
Diop (2012) 1997-2004 ECOWAS Gravity model Yes  Substantial gains in trade 
Tsangarides & Qureshi 
(2008) 
1990-2004 ECOWAS  Clustering analysis No Dissimilar economic 
characteristics between 
WAMZ and WAEMU 
Bangaké (2008) 1990-2003 21 African countries  system of 
simultaneous 
equations and GMM 
Yes/No Yes with Ghana, No with 
Nigeria 
Houssa (2008) 1966-2000 ECOWAS VAR No Asymmetry of supply 
shocks 
Masson (2008) 1995-2000  ECOWAS Welfare gain analysis Yes/No Selective expansion 
Cham (2009). 1980-2005 ECOWAS Exploratory 
convergence criteria  
No Significant absence of 
convergence  
Alagidede et al.  (2012) 1961-2010 Gambia, Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone  
Fractional integration 
and cointegration 
No  Heterogeneity in inflation 
and economic trends 
Chuku (2012) 1970-2010 ECOWAS Symmetry and/or 
asymmetry of 
responses to 
macroeconomic 
shocks. 
No Costs (asymmetry) outweigh 
benefits (symmetry of 
shock). 
Ekpoh & Udoh (2013) 2005-2010 ECOWAS Exploratory 
convergence criteria. 
Yes/No Yes, but at the price of 
monetary 
policy.ineffectiveness is 
boosting output.  
Coulibaly & 
Gnimassoun (2013) 
1985-2009 ECOWAS  Convergence and co-
movements between 
exchange rate 
misalignments. 
Yes/No  The WAEMU could be 
joined by Ghana and 
Gambia. 
Dufrénot & Sugimoto 
(2013) 
1999-2008 ECOWAS Counterfactual 
analyses and 
simulations. 
No  Simulations show little 
support for a dominant peg.  
Asongu (2013b) 1980-2010 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
Granger causality  No Non-traditional monetary 
policy instruments. 
Asongu (2014a) 1980-2009 The Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone 
Cointergration and 
VECM 
Yes/No Evidence of cointegration 
but with dissimilar nexus of 
fundamental with the 
equilibrium. 
Asongu (2014b) 1981-2009 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
GMM No Lack of real, monetary and 
fiscal policy convergence. 
Asongu (2014c) 1980-2010 Gambia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone 
VAR No Ineffective monetary 
policies. 
Saka et al. (2015) 2000-2008 ECOWAS Panel least squares 
and beta convergence. 
Yes/No Evidence of income 
convergence but more 
integration is needed.  
Harvey & Cushing 
(2015) 
1987-2011 Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone 
Structural VAR, 
impulse-response and 
variance 
decomposition. 
No Uncommon sources of 
shocks and asymmetric 
responses to common 
shocks. 
      
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States. RER: Real Exchange Rate. CAEMC: Central African Economic 
and Monetary Community. WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union. GMM: Generalised Method of 
Moments. VECM: Vector Error Correction Model. VAR: Vector autoregression.  
Source: Asongu et al. (2017). 
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The extant literature on the feasibility of the potential monetary zone is mixed at best, 
notably, with results standing for feasibility (Diop, 2012; Ogunkola, 2005), unfeasibility 
(Debrun et al., 2005; Houssa, 2008; Tsangarides & Qureshi, 2006; Cham, 2009; Chuku, 
2012; Alagidede et al., 2012; Dufrénot & Sugimoto, 2013; Asongu, 2013b, 2014b,2014c ; 
Harvey & Cushing, 2015) and contingent feasibility (Bénassy-Quéré & Coupet, 2005; Saka et 
al., 2015; Bangaké, 2008; Asongu, 2014a; Ekpoh & Udoh, 2013)3. It is important to note that 
the mainstream narrative is that the proposed currency in West Africa, while not feasible in 
the short run, could be viable in the long-term, contingent on convergence in some 
fundamental macroeconomic policies. However, it is also relevant to emphasise that there are 
studies which could question this assertion. For instance, Zhao and Kim (2009) reveal 
findings showing that the CFA Franc zone is not an Optimum Currency Union owing to 
asymmetric responses to shocks. Miles (2017) also shows that there is business cycle 
divergence exhibited by countries in the potential WAMU. According to the author, strong 
variations in the structure of the potential member states, rather than just varying policies, 
inhibit the feasibility of the monetary union.  
A recurrent stance in the extant studies is the need for a selective process of 
integration such that some common clusters are identified and integrated first whereas others 
are disqualified as candidates (at the initial phase) on the grounds of fundamental 
asymmetries in underpinning convergence policies. This selective positioning is consistent 
with, inter alia: (i) the readiness of Ghana and the Gambia to integrate the WAEMU 
(Coulibaly & Gnimassoun,  2013) and (ii) the disqualification of Nigeria as a member state of 
the WAMEU (Bénassy-Quéré & Coupet, 2005; Debrunet al., 2005; Bangaké, 2008; Masson, 
2006, 2008). For lack of space and imperative of avoiding repetition, the highlighted 
literature which is synthesized in Table 1 is substantiated in a survey by Asongu et al. (2017).  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
The study is based on annual data for the period 1981 to 2015 from thirteen of the fifteen 
ECOWAS member states, namely: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. The choice 
                                                          
3
 Moreover, the bulk of contemporary financial development literature on Africa has not focused on the 
feasibility of proposed continental monetary unions  (Daniel, 2017; Wale & Makina, 2017;  Chikalipah, 2017; 
Osah & Kyobe, 2017; Bocher et al., 2017;  Oben & Sakyi, 2017; Boadi et al., 2017; Ofori-Sasu et al., 2017; 
Chapoto & Aboagye, 2017; Iyke & Odhiambo, 2017). 
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of annual data is because of data availability constraints for all sampled countries.  Guinea 
and Guinea-Bissau are omitted because of data limitation. The earliest money demand data 
for Guinea is in 1991 while that of Guinea-Bissau is in 1986. The data is from World 
Development Indicators (WDI) and the International Financial Statistics. The adopted 
variables which are in accordance with the literature discussed in the introduction have been 
recently used by Folarin and Asongu (2017). They include: the rate of inflation, foreign 
exchange rate, real effective exchange rate, real gross domestic product and real broad 
money. The definitions of these variables and related sources (which are disclosed in Table 2) 
are substantiated in what follows. 
(i)Real gross domestic product (GDP) is GDP divided by the GDP deflator. It reflects the 
monetary value (evaluated at constant price) related to goods and services that are produced 
within an economy over a specified time interval. (ii) Real broad money represents nominal 
broad money which is divided by the GDP deflator. It articulates narrow money plus time and 
saving deposits (at constant price) with commercial banks. Moreover, real GDP and broad 
money are obtained by dividing GDP and broad money respectively by the consumer price 
index. (iii) The rate of inflation is the GDP deflator and can also be defined as the percentage 
variation in the GDP deflator. (iv) The exchange rate is the official exchange rate in local 
currency units relative to the United States Dollar. (v) Foreign interest rate denotes US three 
month treasury bills, which are short run interest variations on government security. Whereas 
the first-four variables are from World Development Indicators, the fifth is from the 
International Financial Statistics.  
 The summary statistics is disclosed in Table 3. It is apparent from the table that there 
is some considerable degree of variation in the variables being investigated. Hence, we can be 
confident the reasonable estimated nexuses would emerge for the empirical investigation of 
the stability of the demand for money in the proposed WAMU.  
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Table 2: Definitions and sources of variables  
    
Variables Full names Definitions Sources 
    
RM2 Real broad money  Nominal board money 
divided by GDP 
deflator 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
    
RGDP Real GDP Gross domestic 
product divided by 
GDP deflator 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
    
INFL Inflation rate GDP deflator (Annual 
%) 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
    
EXCH Exchange rate Official exchange rate 
- local currency units 
relative to the U.S. 
dollar 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
    
USINTEREST Foreign interest rate USThree month 
treasury bill rate 
International Financial 
statistics (IFS) 
    
Note: The data used for the study span over the period 1981 to 2015. RM2: Real broad money. Real GDP:  Real Gross 
Domestic Product. INFL: Inflation rate. EXCH: Exchange rate. USINTEREST; Foreign interest rate. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
  RM2’Billion RGDP’ Billion INFL EXCH USINTEREST 
 
Benin 
Mean 6.06 21.3 4.35 467.07 4.48 
Maximum 16.9 39.4 35.03 733.04 14.35 
Minimum 2.35 10.7 -4.88 264.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 3.99 8.75 6.77 132.25 3.51 
 
Burkina Faso 
Mean 5.02 20.5 3.22 467.07 4.48 
Maximum 16.6 43.7 14.64 733.04 14.35 
Minimum 1.10 8.31 -6.35 264.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 4.09 11.0 4.31 132.25 3.51 
 
Cabo Verde 
Mean 0.51 0.69 3.69 84.47 4.48 
Maximum 1.41 1.40 49.35 123.23 14.35 
Minimum 0.06 0.16 -29.17 48.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 0.44 0.46 11.11 15.64 3.51 
 
Cote d’Ivoire 
Mean 27.5 99.9 4.60 467.07 4.48 
Maximum 58.5 160 46.39 733.04 14.35 
Minimum 18.5 75.4 -4.52 264.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 9.46 20.1 8.53 132.25 3.51 
 
Gambia 
Mean 0.05 0.15 11.75 16.90 4.48 
Maximum 0.13 0.24 134.04 48.44 14.35 
Minimum 0.01 0.08 -5.97 1.99 0.03 
Standard deviation 0.04 0.05 23.29 12.35 3.51 
 
Ghana 
Mean 0.04 0.15 30.17 0.61 4.48 
Maximum 0.12 0.35 123.06 2.31 14.35 
Minimum <0.01 0.06 11.15 <0.01 0.03 
Standard deviation 0.03 0.08 22.45 0.70 3.51 
 
Liberia 
Mean <0.01 <0.01 4.25 53.65 4.48 
Maximum <0.01 0.01 3.99 46.44 14.35 
Minimum <0.01 <0.01 -10.01 86.19 0.03 
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Standard deviation <0.01 <0.01 7.13 5.48 3.51 
 
Mali 
Mean 5.25 23.1 5.04 467.07 4.48 
Maximum 12.2 44.2 39.56 733.04 14.35 
Minimum 1.72 10.4 -7.59 264.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 3.01 10.4 8.32 132.25 3.51 
 
Niger 
Mean 2.75 16.6 3.60 467.07 4.48 
Maximum 8.16 31.0 32.71 733.04 14.35 
Minimum 0.99 10.2 -5.90 264.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 1.80 5.70 6.64 132.25 3.51 
 
Nigeria 
Mean 75.4 316 22.45 71.41 4.48 
Maximum 223 698 113.08 192.44 14.35 
Minimum 28.0 152 -5.67 0.62 0.03 
Standard deviation 46.2 173 27.73 66.19 3.51 
 
Senegal 
Mean 9.69 33.7 3.74 467.07 4.48 
Maximum 27.5 59.6 33.89 733.04 14.35 
Minimum 4.84 19.6 -2.45 264.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 6.04 11.9 6.38 132.25 3.51 
 
Sierra Leone 
Mean 9.69 53.0 34.07 1751.98 4.48 
Maximum 21.5 107 165.68 5080.75 14.35 
Minimum 3.68 34.5 -3.94 1.16 0.03 
Standard deviation 4.86 18.4 37.62 1647.38 3.51 
 
Togo 
Mean 3.21 8.94 4.72 467.07 4.48 
Maximum 7.75 14.6 35.84 733.04 14.35 
Minimum 1.91 5.89 -9.82 264.69 0.03 
Standard deviation 1.52 2.35 7.57 132.25 3.51 
Notes: RM2 is real board money; RGDP is real gross domestic product; INFL is inflation rate based on GDP deflator; 
EXCH is exchange rate; USINTEREST; Foreign interest rate.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
Following recent literature on the stability of money demand (Folarin & Asongu, 2017), the 
theoretical framework underpinning an assessment of the stability of the demand for money 
is consistent with Hossain (1993, p. 91). For the purpose of this study, whereas real income is 
employed as a scale variable, opportunity variables include: the interest rate and the inflation 
rate. In line with Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2009), the use of interest rate as an 
opportunity variable within the context of developing countries could be misleading because 
of the relative underdevelopment of the financial sector, owing partly to the substantial 
relevance of the informal financial sector. Accordingly, a great chunk of the monetary base in 
developing countries does not circulate within the formal financial sector (Tchamyou & 
Asongu, 2017; Tchamyou et al., 2018). Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan (2009) have further 
argued that such countries with a comparatively undeveloped financial sector reflect a 
tendency in which the interest rate does not mirror the complete marker situation. The 
shortcoming can be addressed by using the inflation rate. In the extant literature, we find 
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studies that have employed both the interest and the inflation rates (e.g. Kumar et al., 2013) 
as well as those that have exclusively used the interest rate (Akinlo, 2006; Anoruo, 2002). We 
employ both the interest rate and inflation rate in this study.  
 The money demand literature has emphasised the importance of considering currency 
substitution as well as foreign interest rates in the investigation of the demand function of 
money (Folarin & Asongu, 2017). For example, according to Chaisrisawatsuk et al. (2004), 
with respect to the consideration of foreign bonds by citizens as an alternative mechanism of 
investment, the projected return on the corresponding investment should have an incidence 
on the demand for money. It is essential to also point out that, the effect of exchange rate on 
the demand for money is mirrored by currency substitution whereas the importance of foreign 
interest rates on the demand for money is articulated by the effect of capital mobility.  
 Building on the discussed empirical background, the assessment of money demand in 
this paper can be expressed by the following equation: ܯ/� =  ݂ሺ�, ݋݌, �� , ܧሻ,         (1) 
where M/P is real monetary aggregate, M is nominal monetary aggregate, p is price level, y is 
income variable, op are opportunity variables, �� is foreign interest rate and E is real 
effective exchange rate.  
Equation (1) can be re-expressed in a double log form as follows: lnሺܯ/݌ሻ� =  ߚ଴ + ߚଵ�݊�� + ߚଶ��� + ߚଷ�ܰܨ� +  ߚସ��� +  ߚହlnE� +  ߝ�               (2) 
where, ln is natural logarithm, y is real income,  �� is domestic interest rate, INF is inflation 
rate, ߚ′s are the coefficients for the variables considered in the study, ߝ is the residual term 
and t is time. 
Given that the variables in Equation (2) are in time series, it is relevant to test their 
corresponding stationary properties in order to avoid spurious regressions. Such stationary 
properties are tested with the Ng-Perron (NP) test which has been established to be 
comparatively more reliable and efficient (compared to Phillip-Perron and Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test) when the time series is of longer periodicity. Four different estimation 
approaches under Ng-Perron are considered, namely, MZa, MZt, MSB and MPT. In essence, 
the underlying tests are from Ng and Peron (2001), who propose some improvements to the 
Phillips (1987) test, (MZa), Phillips and Perron (1988) (MZt), Bhargava (1986)(MSB), and 
the Point Optimal Test by Elliot et al. (1996)(MPT). 
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Table 4: Ng-Perron Unit root test results 
  RM2 ∆RM2 RGDP ∆RGDP INFL EXCH ∆EXCH USINT 
 
Benin 
MZa -5.627 -16.441a -6.468 -16.442a -14.928a -6.109 -15.382a -20.794b 
MZt -1.515 -2.866a -1.765 -2.861a -2.707a -1.745 -2.760a -3.204b 
MSB 0.269 0.174b 0.273 0.174b 0.181a 0.286 0.179a 0.154b 
MPT 15.807 1.494a 14.089 1.513a 1.736a 14.914 1.641a 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Burkina 
Faso 
MZa -9.966 -16.016a -3.696 -16.018a -10.748b -6.109 -15.382a -20.794b 
MZt -2.107 -2.809a -1.330 -2.810a -2.299b -1.745 -2.760a -3.204b 
MSB 0.211 0.175b 0.360 0.175b 0.214b 0.286 0.179b 0.154b 
MPT 9.682 1.608a 24.202 1.605a 2.354b 14.914 1.641a 4.506b 
Lag  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Cabo 
Verde 
MZa -31.538a  -8.414 -11.182b -15.431a -4.675 -10.647b -20.794b 
MZt -3.947a  -1.865 -2.335b -2.768a -1.528 -2.273b -3.204b 
MSB 0.125a  0.222 -0.209b 0.179a 0.328 0.213b 0.154b 
MPT 3.024a  11.395 2.306b 1.623a 19.482 2.435b 4.506b 
Lag 2  1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
MZa -2.398 -16.003a -25.731a  -15.793a -6.109 -15.382a -20.794b 
MZt -0.777 -2.755a -3.298b  -2.808a -1.745 -2.760a -3.204b 
MSB 0.324 0.172a 0.128a  0.178b 0.286 0.179b 0.154b 
MPT 26.118 1.803a 5.171a  1.561a 14.914 1.641a 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 1  0 0 0 1 
 
Gambia 
MZa -2.094 -16.425a -15.369c -16.120a -16.865a -9.061 -15.666a -20.794b 
MZt -0.990 -2.864a -2.772c -2.814a -2.904a -2.123 -2.796a -3.204b 
MSB 0.473 0.174b 0.180c 0.175b 0.172a 0.234 0.178b 0.154b 
MPT 41.623 1.497a 5.932c 1.613a 1.453a 10.076 1.576a 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 
Ghana 
MZa -9.647 -16.379a -3.257 -4.821 14.001a -4.829 -11.754b -20.794b 
MZt -2.177 -2.860a -1.062 -1.525 -2.598b -1.404 -2.421b -3.204b 
MSB 0.226 0.175b 0.326 0.316 0.186b 0.291 0.206b 0.154b 
MPT 9.526 1.503a 23.712 5.142 1.930b 17.995 2.097b 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
 
Liberia 
MZa -16.910c -22.849a -8.213 -11.290b -15.308a -16.103a  -20.794b 
MZt -2.886c -3.379a -1.981 -2.376b -2.763a -2.773a  -3.204b 
MSB 0.171c 0.148a 0.241 0.210b 0.181b 0.172a  0.154b 
MPT 5.521c 1.076a 11.228 2.171b 1.613a 1.758a  4.506b 
Lag 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Mali 
MZa -11.872 -16.374a -6.532 -14.756a -15.966a -6.109 -15.382a -20.794b 
MZt -2.423 -2.857a -1.801 -2.679a -2.815a -1.745 -2.760a -3.204b 
MSB 0.204 0.174b 0.276 0.182b 0.176b 0.286 0.179b 0.154b 
MPT 7.747 1.512a 13.952 1.799b 1.572a 14.914 1.641a 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Niger 
MZa -1.552 -6.472c -2.164 -14.924a -15.778a -6.109 -15.382a -20.794b 
MZt -0.654 -1.783c -0.792 -2.730a -2.779a -1.745 -2.760a -3.204b 
MSB 0.422 0.275c 0.366 0.183a 0.176b 0.286 0.179a 0.154b 
MPT 38.750 3.839c 30.333 1.650a 1.664a 14.914 1.641a 4.506b 
Lag 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Nigeria 
MZa -5.286 -16.254a -1.588 -14.850a -16.998a -2.489 -16.234a -20.794b 
MZt -1.612 -2.850a -0.777 -2.725a -2.899a -0.937 -2.848a -3.204b 
MSB 0.305 0.175a 0.489 0.183b 0.171a 0.376 0.175a 0.154b 
MPT 17.187 1.511a 46.982 1.651a 1.499a 29.967 1.514a 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Senegal 
MZa -1.008 -15.197a -3.045 -15.626a -15.071a -6.109 -15.382a -20.794b 
MZt -0.432 -2.688a -1.084 -2.786a -2.710a -1.745 -2.760a -3.204b 
MSB 0.428 0.177a 0.356 0.178a 0.180a 0.286 0.179b 0.154b 
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MPT 42.290 1.868b 26.315 1.602a 1.757a 14.914 1.641a 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
 
Sierra 
Leone 
MZa -1.563 -15.062a -2.065 -16.191a -10.909b -3.829 -10.469b -20.794b 
MZt -0.736 -2.709a -0.936 -2.522b -2.335b -1.241 -2.286b -3.204b 
MSB 0.471 0.180b 0.453 0.156a 0.214b 0.324 0.218b 0.154b 
MPT 44.749 1.759a 39.580 2.645b 2.249b 21.906 2.349b 4.506b 
Lag 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
 
Togo 
MZa -2.692 -16.408a -7.560 -15.504a -16.775a -6.109 -15.382a -20.794b 
MZt -0.934 -2.837a -1.794 -2.754a -2.886a -1.745 -2.760a -3.204b 
MSB 0.347 0.173a 0.237 0.178b 0.172a 0.286 0.179b 0.154b 
MPT 26.890 1.593a 12.355 1.693a 1.496a 14.914 1.641a 4.506b 
Lag 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Note: a, b, c implies statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. The variables were estimated 
using constant and trend for level equation except for inflation rate. This is because the inflation rate does not 
exhibit a trending pattern unlike for other variables. Moreover, applying first difference removes a trend thus 
making constant (intercept) the appropriate approach for inflation.RM2 is real board money; RGDP is real gross 
domestic product; INFL is inflation rate based on GDP deflator; EXCH is exchange rate; USINTEREST is 
foreign interest rate. The reported values are the corresponding t-statistics. Automatic lag length selection based 
on Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) was employed and the resulting optimal lag length is used and reported. 
 
In the light of the unit root test findings provided in Table 4, the variables used in the 
study comprises of those that are stationary in level and first difference. Inflation rate is 
stationary in level for all the countries while money demand, real income and exchange rate 
are stationary in difference for majority of the countries. A direct implication is that the 
ARDL empirical strategy is more appropriate. The corresponding ARDL bounds test 
framework from Pesaran et al. (2001) is employed to assess if variables have a long term 
nexus or are cointegrated. An appealing feature of this technique over alternative approaches 
(e.g. Engle & Granger and Johansen tests) is that the adopted variables must not exclusively 
display the same order of integration. The corresponding ARDL model is specified in 
Equation (3) as follows: ∆lnሺܯ/݌ሻ� = ߜ଴ +  ߜଵlnሺܯ/݌ሻ�−ଵ + ߜଶ�݊��−ଵ +  ߜଷ���−ଵ + ߜସ�ܰܨ�−ଵ +   ߜହ���−ଵ + ߜ଺�݊ܧ�−ଵ + ߜ଻��݁݊݀ + ∑ �ଵ�௟�=ଵ ∆lnሺܯ/݌ሻ�−� + ∑ �ଶ�௠�=଴ ∆�݊��−ଵ +  ∑ �ଷ�௡�=଴ ∆���−ଵ + ∑ �ସ�௡�=଴ ∆�ܰܨ�−ଵ +  ∑ �ହ�௢�=଴ ∆���−ଵ + ∑ �଺�௣�=଴ ∆�݊ܧ�−ଵε�    
           (3) 
The expanded ARDL approach in Equation (3) is estimated by performing the Bounds test. 
Optimal lag selection for each variable is based on the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). 
By means of the Wald restriction, the F-statistics is then estimated, notably: by assigning 
restrictions to the lagged value of all level series corresponding to the two equations (see 
Pesaran et al., 2001). The related F-statistics is later employed to examine the long run 
relationship among adopted variables. It is important to note that the null hypothesis 
15 
 
corresponding to the Wald restriction which is imposed on Equation (3) is the 
following: ߜଶ = ߜଷ = ߜସ = ߜସ = ߜହ = ߜ଺ = 0. 
The value of the F-statistics is derived by comparing the critical values of the upper 
limit vis-à-vis those of the lower limit. The critical values are from Pesaran et al. (2001). As 
far as cointegration is concerned, in a situation where the estimated F-statistics surpasses the 
critical value corresponding to the upper limit, then the null hypothesis for the position of “no 
cointegration” is rejected and evidence of cointegration or a long run nexus is established. On 
the contrary, in a scenario where the F-statistics is situated below the lower critical value, the 
corresponding hypothesis of cointegration is rejected. Unfortunately, evidence of the absence 
or presence of cointegration cannot be established with certainty if the F-statistics falls 
between the critical values in the lower limit and upper limit. The results that are disclosed in 
Table 5 show that cointegration is apparent.  
 
Table 5: Results of the ARDL Co-integration tests 
 
Notes: *, **, *** are significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
ARDL: Autoregressive Distributed Lag. Critical values are the following:  
(i) 2.45 for I0 Bound and  3.52 for the I1 Bound at the 10% significance level;  
(ii) 2.86 for I0 Bound and 4.01 for the I1 Bound for the 5% significance level;  
(iii) 3.25 for I0 Bound and 4.49 for the I1 Bound for the 2.5% significance level  
and (iv) 3.74 for I0 Bound and 5.06 for the I1 Bound for the 1% significance level. 
 
In Table 5, the results of the cointegration are presented. From the results, evidence of 
cointegration is obvious in more than half (i.e. seven) of the selected ECOWAS countries, 
namely: Cabo Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Since, we could 
not establish that co-integration holds in the remaining six member states, (i.e.Benin, Burkina 
Countries ARDL structure F-statistics Remarks 
Benin 1,0,0,1,1 3.079 Not cointegrated 
Burkina 
Faso 
1,0,0,0,1 2.780 Not cointegrated 
Cabo Verde 2,1,0,1,0 6.426*** Cointegrated 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
1,0,0,0,0 1.249 Not cointegrated 
Gambia 2,0,1,0,3 6.185*** Cointegrated 
Ghana 3,0,3,3,1 10.358*** Cointegrated 
Liberia 2,3,3,3,3 6.909*** Cointegrated 
Mali 1,3,0,0,1 3.539* Cointegrated 
Niger 1,0,0,0,3 1.739 Not  cointegrated 
Nigeria 2,3,1,2,1 4.151** Cointegrated 
Senegal 3,0,1,0,2 4.294** Cointegrated 
Sierra Leone 1,0,0,0,3 1.370 Not  cointegrated 
Togo  1,3,0,0,0 1.211 Not  cointegrated 
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Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo) we perform only short-run analysis for 
these member states. 
 Given the findings from the cointegration test, the long run and short-run effects are 
further investigated within an error correction model (ECM) framework. Within this 
empirical setting, in a scenario of short-term shock, the error correction term (ECT) is the 
speed of adjustment back to the long run equilibrium or cointegration relationship. 
Furthermore, the ECM also enables the study to examine the impacts of adopted variables in 
the conditioning information set on the short run and long run demand for money.  
 The ECM is an embodiment of two steps. The first is focused on the derivation of the 
ECT by means of regressing the dependent variable on the corresponding independent 
variables and then deducting the actual value of the outcome variable from the estimated 
value. This is illustrated as follows.  ܧ�� = lnሺܯ/݌ሻ� − ሺ �଴ + �ଵ� + �ଶ�݊�� + �ଷ��� + �ସ�ܰܨ� +  �ହ��� +  �଺�݊ܧ�ሻ          (4) 
Given the trending character of adopted variables, a trend is introduced into the regression 
equation. The ECT obtained from Equation (4) is then fitted in Equation (2) in order to derive 
Equation (5) which is used to estimate the ECM. The corresponding speed of adjustment is 
expected to show a negative sign in order for the equilibrium nexus to be potentially 
restorable  in case of an exogenous shock. Emphasis should be made on the fact that, the 
negative  speed of adjustment should fall within the range of  0 and  1, with 1 corresponding 
to a full adjustment and 0 corresponding to absence of an adjustment, one period after an 
exogenous shock. On the contrary, a positive value of the adjustment coefficient reflects the 
absence of catch-up towards the long run cointegration after such an exogenous shock. 
Ultimately, this reflects a permanent move from the equilibrium nexus (Asongu, 2014e).  ∆lnሺܯ/݌ሻ� =  ߛ଴ +  ߛଵ∆�݊�� + ߛଶ∆��� + ߛଷ�ܰܨ� +  ߛସ∆��� +  ߛହ∆�݊ܧ� +  �ܧ���−ଵ + ߝ�
  (5) 
The Bai and Perron test is employed to analyse the consistency of parameters (Bai & Perron, 
1998; 2003). This test provides information about the stability of the parameters used in the 
study. Moreover, some diagnostic tests are conducted on the findings from the ECM in order 
to further assess its robustness and goodness of fit. These tests include, the: Jarque-Bera test 
for normality, Breusch-Godfrey (BG) test for serial correlation test and Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) test for heteroscedasticity. 
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4. Empirical results  
Tables 6-7 show short term and long run relationships between the broad money 
aggregate and its determinants for the thirteen sampled countries. While Table 6 focuses on 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana and Liberia, Table 7 is 
concerned with Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.  The last column of 
Table 7 provides panel-based evidence for the thirteen countries. Both, the long-run and short 
term analyses are performed exclusively for countries in which cointegration is established 
whereas only short term analysis is performed for countries for which cointegration is not 
apparent.  In a nutshell, from both short term and long run perspectives, the results provide 
empirical evidence on the influence of income, inflation, exchange rate and foreign interest 
rate on the demand for money in the ECOWAS region.  
The tables reveal that factors influencing the demand for money significantly vary 
across member states in the ECOWAS. We start our discussion of the results with the short-
run analysis. Here we find that an increase in income has a positive and significant 
contemporary effect on demand for money in about 70% of the selected member states, 
namely: Benin, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo. The coefficient of income ranges from 1.622 for Senegal to 0.341 for Liberia. In 
addition, the results reveal that in some member states, (i.e. Cabo Verde, Gambia, Ghana, 
Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone), a change in inflation rate in the short-run has a 
significant negative effect on money demand. Furthermore, the results suggest that a change 
in exchange rate has a significant and positive effect on money demand in Cabo Verde, 
Gambia, Ghana, and Nigeria while in Liberia and Niger, a significant negative effect is 
observed. The last determinant examined in the study is foreign interest rate 
(USINTEREST).The findings reveal that the contemporary foreign interest rate exerts a 
negative and significant effect on money demand in Cabo Verde, and Liberia. Also, the lag 
value of foreign interest rate is negatively associated with demand for money in Gambia, 
Liberia and Senegal, thus reflecting capital mobility in response to higher interest rate in 
foreign country, US. 
Furthermore, from the seven member states in the ECOWAS in which we were able 
to establish the existence of a long-run relationship between money demand and its 
determinants, we find that the signs of ECT coefficients are statistically significant with the 
expected negative sign. Going by the values of the ECT coefficients, it can be deduced that if 
shocks occur in countries within the ECOWAS, Liberia will restore its long-run equilibrium 
18 
 
first then followed by Mali while Gambia will restore its long-run equilibrium last. In 
decreasing order of quick speed to restoring the long-run equilibrium, we have Liberia, Mali, 
Ghana, Cabo Verde, Senegal, Nigeria and the Gambia.  
We now turn to the long-run results, it is apparent from the findings that the effect of 
income on money demand is significant with the expected sign in Cabo Verde, Ghana, 
Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal. The coefficient of income is greater than one across the 
three countries were the impact is significant, thus suggesting that an increase in income 
leads to a more than proportionate increase in the demand for money in the long-run. In 
addition, an increase in inflation rate has a significant and negative effect on money demand 
in Cabo Verde, Ghana, Liberia, and Mali while the effect is established to be insignificant 
with the expected negative sign in Nigeria and Senegal. The implication to our findings is 
that a decrease in the opportunity cost of holding money increases money demand. 
On the effect of exchange rate, an increase in exchange rate has a significant and 
positive effect on money demand in Gambia and Ghana. In addition, the findings reveal that 
foreign interest rate has a significant and negative effect on money demand in Cabo Verde, 
Ghana and Mali, the corresponding effect is positive and significant in Gambia and Senegal 
while insignificant in Liberia and Nigeria. 
In the last column of Table 7, which is the panel evidence, the ECT is negative and 
significant and only income has a significant effect on money holding in the ECOWAS as a 
group in the short-run. However, in the long-run, the results show that income has a positive 
and significant effect on money demand while inflation rate, exchange rate and foreign 
interest rate have significant negative effects on money demand, which is consistent with the 
theory. Accordingly, opportunity variables are expected to have an inverse relationship with 
money demand.  
With respect to the stability of money among ECOWAS member states, the findings 
in Table 8 reveal some form of heterogeneity.  To be specific, the results reveal that the 
demand for money is stable in ten out of the thirteen selected ECOWAS member states based 
on the Bai and Perron test. They include: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone. The remaining three countries 
exhibit instability. They are Liberia in 2012, Mali in 2002 and Togo in 1998. 
Overall, in Tables 6-7, the diagnostic tests of residuals overwhelmingly confirm the 
presence of normally distributed errors (i.e. failure to reject the null hypothesis of Jarque-
19 
 
Bera test) and absence of serial correlation (i.e. failure to reject the null hypothesis of the 
Breusch-Godfrey).  
Table 6: ARDL Estimation 
        
 Benin Burkina 
Faso 
Cabo 
Verde 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Gambia Ghana Liberia 
        
Long-run estimation        
        
Constant 
 
 -5.024** 
(2.154) 
 7.232 
(43.123) 
9.447*** 
(2.693) 
12.176*** 
(0.725) 
LRGDP 
 
 1.217*** 
(0.104) 
 -0.040 
(2.462) 
0.468*** 
(0.135) 
-0.205** 
(0.079) 
INFL 
 
 -0.009** 
(0.003) 
 -0.099** 
(0.047) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.004) 
LEXCH 
 
 0.069 
(0.191) 
 3.661** 
(1.691) 
0.236*** 
(0.029) 
0.252 
(0.216) 
USINTEREST  
 -0.074** 
(0.028) 
 0.678** 
(0.283) 
-0.042** 
(0.017) 
0.034 
(0.023) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Short-run estimation        
      
 
 
∆LRM2(-1)   0.488*** 
(0.113) 
 -0.577*** 
(0.195) 
-0.193* 
(0.100) 
0.475*** 
(0.135) 
∆LRM2(-2)     
 -0.390*** 
(0.124) 
 
∆LRGDP 1.419* 
(0.699) 
0.188 
(0.584) 
1.310*** 
(0.251) 
0.639* 
(0.329) 
-0.180 
(0.503) 
0.007 
(0.309) 
0.341*** 
(0.064) 
∆LRGDP(-1)       0.370*** 
(0.087) 
∆LRGDP(-2)       0.544*** 
(0.107) 
∆INFL 0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
∆INFL(-1)   
 
  0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
∆INFL(-2)      0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
∆LEXCH -0.004 
(0.147) 
-0.073 
(0.166) 
0.322*** 
(0.091) 
0.080 
(0.162) 
0.443** 
(0.161) 
0.290*** 
(0.078) 
-0.683*** 
(0.021) 
∆LEXCH(-1)      0.041 
(0.063) 
0.019 
(0.141) 
∆LEXCH(-2)      0.165*** 
(0.040) 
-0.276*** 
(0.049) 
∆USINTEREST 0.003 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.012) 
-0.024*** 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
-0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.045*** 
(0.011) 
∆USINTEREST(-1)     0.023 
(0.015) 
 -0.015 
(0.010) 
∆USINTEREST(-2)     -0.049*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.035*** 
(0.009) 
ECT(-1) 
  -0.349*** 
(0.063) 
 -0.105*** 
(0.016) 
-0.604*** 
(0.089) 
-0.958*** 
(0.203) 
R-squared 0.158 0.029 0.803 0.094 0.833 0.864 0.993 
Normality test 0.234 0.000 0.628 0.000 0.760 0.062 0.895 
ARCH test (1)0.809 
(3)0.802 
(1)0.445 
(3)0.757 
(1)0.400 
(3)0.485 
(1)0.291 
(3)0.699 
(1)0.360 
(3)0.331 
(1)0.203 
(3)0.584 
(1)0.000 
(3)0.008 
BG LM test (1)0.787 
(3)0.983 
(1)0.397 
(3)0.421 
(1)0.845 
(3)0.975 
(1)0.253 
(3)0.532 
(1)0.494 
(3)0.802 
(1)0.002 
(3)0.002 
(1)0.198 
(3)0.297 
Notes: *,**, *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The reported values in parenthesis are the standard 
error. The reported value for Normality test, ARCH test and BG LM test are the probability value of the f-statistics. BG is 
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Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test. RM2: Real broad money. Real GDP:  Real Gross Domestic Product. INFL: 
Inflation rate. EXCH: Exchange rate. USINTEREST; Foreign interest rate 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: ARDL Estimation (Continuation) 
        
 Mali Niger Nigeria Senegal  Sierra 
Leone 
Togo All 
        
Long-run estimation        
Constant 2.836 
(3.015) 
 -13.003* 
(6.958) 
-40.593*** 
(10.043) 
  -0.221*** 
(0.049) 
LRGDP 0.813*** 
(0.136) 
 1.439*** 
(0.259) 
2.672*** 
(0.409) 
  1.122*** 
(0.219) 
INFL -0.013*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
  -0.061*** 
(0.016) 
LEXCH 0.080 
(0.104) 
 -0.115 
(0.087) 
-0.216 
(0.146) 
  -0.070 
(0.071) 
USINTEREST -0.061*** 
(0.019) 
 0.045 
(0.057) 
0.071* 
(0.035) 
  -0.074** 
(0.038) 
       
 
Short-run estimation        
        
∆LRM2(-1)  
 0.828*** 
(0.091) 
-0.176 
(0.160) 
   
∆LRM2(-1)    -0.472*** 
(0.128) 
   
∆LRGDP 0.831** 
(0.308) 
0.419 
(0.531) 
0.568*** 
(0.146) 
1.622*** 
(0.484) 
0.651* 
(0.344) 
0.675* 
(0.341) 
0.521*** 
(0.128) 
∆LRGDP(-1) -0.189 
(0.347) 
 -0.290* 
(0.148) 
    
∆LRGDP(-2) -0.744** 
(0.357) 
 0.606** 
(0.212) 
    
∆INFL -0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
∆LEXCH 0.097 
(0.114) 
-0.396** 
(0.178) 
0.018 
(0.030) 
-0.120 
(0.091) 
-0.113 
(0.098) 
0.012 
(0.134) 
0.033 
(0.092) 
∆LEXCH(-1)  
 0.143*** 
(0.043) 
    
∆USINTEREST 0.009 
(0.013) 
0.018 
(0.019) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
0.036*** 
(0.010) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
0.015 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
∆USINTEREST(-1)    -0.023** 
(0.008) 
   
ECT(-1) -0.696*** 
(0.127) 
 -0.274*** 
(0.049) 
-0.293*** 
(0.055) 
  -0.083*** 
(0.012) 
R-squared 0.764 0.172 0.932 0.697 0.376 0.234  
Normality test 0.598 0.964 0.000 0.940 0.832 0.475  
ARCH test (1)0.396 
(3)0.176 
(1)0.081 
(3)0.365 
(1)0.779 
(3)0.897 
(1)0.188 
(3)0.559 
(1)0.550 
(3)0.794 
(1)0.506 
(3)0.307 
 
BG LM test (1)0.766 
(3)0.966 
(1)0.947 
(3)0.860 
(1)0.561 
(3)0.486 
(1)0.684 
(3)0.152 
(1)0.195 
(3)0.386 
(1)0.371 
(3)0.149 
 
Notes: *,**, *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. The reported values in parenthesis are the standard 
error. The reported value for Normality test, ARCH test and BG LM test are the probability value of the f-statistics. BG is 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test. RM2: Real broad money. Real GDP:  Real Gross Domestic Product. INFL: 
Inflation rate. EXCH: Exchange rate. USINTEREST; Foreign interest rate 
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Table 8: Bai and Perron stability tests results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*significant at the 5% level; ** Bai and Perron (2003) critical value 
  
5. Conclusion and future research directions 
This study examines the stability of money in the proposed West African Monetary Union 
(WAMU). The study uses annual data for the period 1981 to 2015 from thirteen of the fifteen 
countries making-up the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). A 
standard money demand function is designed and estimated using a bounds testing approach 
to co-integration and error-correction modeling. The findings show divergence across 
ECOWAS member states in the stability of money. This divergence is informed by 
differences in cointegration, stability, short run and long term determinants and error 
correction in event of a shock. Cointegration is apparent only in half of the sampled 
countries, namely: Cabo Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. In 
event of a shock, Liberia will restore its long-run equilibrium first followed by Mali, Ghana, 
Cabo Verde, Senegal, Nigeria and the Gambia. The demand for money is stable in ten of the 
thirteen selected ECOWAS member states based on the Bai and Perron test, namely: Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra 
Leone. The remaining three countries exhibit instability, namely: Liberia, Mali and Togo.  
 Among other factors, the established divergence could be the result of information 
asymmetry associated with targets and benchmarks related to the demand for money. The 
underlying policy syndrome of information asymmetry can be mitigated by enhancing 
Country Break test F-statistics Critical value** 
Benin 0 vs 1 3.768 11.47 
Burkina Faso 0 vs 1 3.921 11.47 
Cabo Verde 0 vs 1 9.863 11.47 
Cote d’Ivoire 0 vs 1 11.433 11.47 
Gambia 0 vs 1 7.496 11.47 
Ghana 0 vs 1 6.599 11.47 
Liberia 0 vs 1 (2012)* 11.477 11.47 1 vs 2 1.527 12.95 
Mali 0 vs 1 (2002)* 15.786 11.47 1 vs 2 4.558 12.95 
Niger 0 vs 1 7.984 11.47 
Nigeria 0 vs 1 5.514 11.47 
Senegal 0 vs 1 3.574 11.47 
Sierra Leone 0 vs 1 6.149 11.47 
Togo 0 vs 1 (1998)* 19.529 11.47 1 vs 2 5.835 12.95 
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mechanism of information sharing, notably, by: updating and synchronising data collection 
facilities, improving competences and skills, harmonizing statistics and bridging technology 
gaps.  Future research can focus on examining how reducing such information asymmetry 
improves the feasibility of the proposed WAMU.  
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